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Abstract 
The American government targeting of US-based Islamic charities came as response to the shock of the 
9/11 attacks, especially its devastating effects on the self-esteem of the American people and their sense 
of national pride. Actually, they came as part of the “War on Terror”, a phrase used for the first time by 
President Bush in his famous September 20, 2001 speech. 
But cracking down on US-based Islamic relief groups meant, first and foremost, keeping them under a 
tight scrutiny in an attempt to thwart the financing of terrorism, after the government discovered that 
al-Qaeda and other militant groups had abused charities to fund attacks across the globe.  
This paper takes the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation as a case study, not only because it was the 
first of its kind to come under the spotlight of law enforcement officials, but also because it had been 
the largest Muslim charitable organization before it was shut by the Bush administration in December 
2001. More importantly, it explores the controversy over civil rights, especially the unwavering 
contention opposing advocates of unrestricted governmental powers to preserve national security, to 
individual liberties champions, more concerned about the consequential erosion of such constitutional 
rights, and staunchly committed to defend them. 
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1. Introduction 
“Arab Americans are racially profiled in what’s called secret evidence. People are stopped in airports 
on suspicion and we’ve got to do something about that” (Note 1). 
This was George W. Bush’s response, in 2004, to a question about racial discrimination during his 
second presidential debate with Al Gore, the Democratic candidate. He pointedly alluded to a tactic 
wielded by Clinton’s administration, which consists of keeping evidence secret both from people 
suspected of terrorist activity and their lawyers. Bush even mentioned his support for a legislation 
sponsored by his future Secretary of Energy, Michigan Senator Spencer Abraham, to repeal the Secret 
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Evidence Act (Note 2). 
George W. Bush ended up securing seventy-two percent of the American Muslims’ vote (against only 
eight percent who voted for Gore and nineteen percent for the Lebanese-American Ralph Nader, the 
Green Party candidate), a historic record which Arab and Muslim activists attributed to their massive 
rally behind the Republican candidate in Florida. Bush won this state by slightly more than 500 votes in 
the final recount after a three-week suspense (ninety percent of the state’s 40,000 Muslim voters cast 
ballots for him) in a crucial battle that opened the doors of the White House wide for him (Note 3). 
But the honeymoon period was soon to come to an end. American Muslims were now oriented towards 
the Republican candidate who openly acknowledged such issues as abortion, school vouchers, and 
government funding for faith-based charities. Accordingly, Bush’s views were more in line with the 
beliefs of American Muslims than were those of his Democratic rival (Note 4). In a single stroke, the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
shattered any hope to blunt the negative image conveyed about them. Muslims were utterly viewed as 
the members of a cult based on hatred of the American society and associated with terrorist networks. 
Worse, the terrorist attacks not only sparked anti-Islamic sentiments across the nation and stirred up 
prejudice and bigotry against those “mainstream Americans” associated with Islam, but also laid bare 
the vulnerability of Arabs and Muslims who started to fear for their future as U.S. citizens. Expectedly, 
suspicion of Muslims skyrocketed across the country, the incidence of hate crimes reached 
unprecedented heights, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Justice Department detained and 
interrogated hundreds of Arab and Muslim immigrants suspected of having terrorist ties, and law 
enforcement officials cracked down on Muslim charities. 
The study under consideration delves into the quandary of U.S Islamic charities in the wake of 9/11. It 
seeks to examine the role of the federal government in a nationwide campaign to target Muslim relief 
groups which it accuses of ties to terrorist networks. It takes the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation as 
a case study, not only because it was the first of its kind to come under the spotlight of law enforcement 
officials, but also because it had been the largest Muslim charitable organization before it was shut 
down by the Bush administration in December 2001. More importantly, this study raises the issue of 
civil liberties, especially the on-going debate between the advocates of expanded governmental powers 
to preserve national security, and their detractors who, in the name of higher values enshrined in the 
American Constitution, are more concerned about the consequential erosion of fundamental individual 
rights. 
Departing from the argument that striking a flawless balance between the national security and civil 
liberties would be beyond reach, the present work raises the question of “exceptionalism”, as many 
started to apprehend that in the process of defending Americans' freedoms, the federal authority may 
wipe out the very “freedoms” it is presumed to shield.  
This paper is articulated around three broad questions:  
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First, presupposing the relation between liberty and security as one of balance, and therefore increasing 
one means reducing the other, should a liberal nation, like the United States, ever act “illiberally” and 
sacrifice one of its widely cherished values to defend its national security? In other words, what 
exceptional circumstances could justify exceptional measures and legitimize illiberal practices, 
especially the violation of civil liberties? 
Second, assuming that “liberty” and “security” are intrinsically intertwined, with, on the one hand, civil 
liberties campaigners claiming to defend liberty against the government, and, on the other hand, the 
government, firmly resolute to guarantee the security necessary for that liberty to persist, how is it 
possible for both sides to engage in critical questioning of the core meaning of the two concepts and 
reach some common grounds on that level? To put it differently, is liberty the embodiment of all the 
political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the American Constitution, or is it simply the 
sovereign right of the federal government to lay security ahead of liberty as a sine qua non to preserve 
and guarantee that constitutional right? 
Finally, considering the 9/11 tragedy as, first and foremost, an attack on liberty, and that it is the role of 
the government to protect that right even if that meant its exceptional suspension, should the latter 
perceive this prerogative as a blank check to proceed with unchecked powers and operate outside the 
confines of the American Constitution? The cracking down on the Holy Land Foundation, in this 
respect, is a case in point. 
 
2. “Countering Terrorism” 
Government targeting of U.S. Islamic charities was the net result of the shock of the 9/11 attacks, 
particularly their destructive repercussions on the self-esteem of the American people and their sense of 
national pride. The government’s action was part of the “war on terror”, a phrase used for the first time 
by President Bush in his September 20, 2011 speech before a joint session of Congress, when he 
declared: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Note 5). 
But cracking down on U.S.-based Islamic relief groups meant first keeping them under a tight scrutiny. 
To this end, a battery of both executive and legislative decisions have been put forward to make sure 
that the money donated to charitable organizations does not end in the hands of evil-doers. The new 
policy came, in fact, as an attempt to thwart the financing of terrorism, after the government discovered 
that al-Qaeda and other militant groups had used charities to fund attacks across the globe.  
On September 24, 2001, less than two weeks after the attacks, President George W. Bush issued 
Executive Order 13224 (Note 6), an integral component of his counterterrorism program which 
mandates that “no U.S. company shall do business with any person that is subject to the prohibitions of 
the Executive Order. Such persons include those who have been determined to have committed, or pose 
a risk of committing or supporting terrorist acts, and those identified on the list of ‘Specially 
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Designated Nationals’ (SDNs) (and Blocked Persons), generated by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC.” (Note 7). (OFAC operates under the auspices of the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
On October 26 of the same year, subsequent to Executive Order 13224, the USA Patriot Act (Note 8) 
was signed into law. Both measures aimed to combat terrorist activities by disrupting the financial 
support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations and restricting their access to financial 
resources in the USA. Both decisions also gave sweeping authority to the Treasury Department and its 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to administer and enforce sanctions against foreign countries 
blacklisted as terrorism sponsors (strictly prohibiting American companies to do business with them). 
The USA Patriot Act conspicuously gave the government predominantly unchecked power to designate 
any group, be it charitable, as a terrorist organization. Once blacklisted, the Treasury immediately 
confiscates its files and computers, and seizes its assets. Ergo, the group under investigation faces a 
number of challenges, namely: hiring lawyers and mounting a defence since of course it lacks the 
required resources to do so. The suspected group also finds itself legally barred from accessing the 
government’s classified evidence to understand the basis of the charges. In a word, the government can 
target any charity, seize or freeze its assets, shut it down, arrest its leaders, launch legal proceedings 
against it, including criminal prosecutions, and delay the trial indefinitely, since the charity in question 
has only limited rights to appeal to the courts. 
In almost the same period, the government launched another U.S. multi-agency task force: Operation 
Green Quest (OGQ). Consistent with its unyielding line of conduct, its preeminent purpose was “to 
augment existing counter-terrorist efforts by bringing the full scope of the government’s financial 
expertise to bear against systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as sources of terrorist 
funding” (Note 9). OGQ would act as the investigative arm of the Treasury’s Office and operate to 
identify, infiltrate, and dismantle organizations that function covertly as financial backers of al-Qaeda 
and its regional chapters across the world. Its task consisted primarily in tracking underground financial 
operations, especially dubious money transactions where a charity may be a link. Said Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael Chertoff, Head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, “The lifeblood 
of terrorism is money, and if we cut the money we cut the blood supply” (Note 10).  
Operation Green Quest was equally expected to investigate and uncover suspected ties between money 
laundering and terrorism financing. Security experts refer to this process as the “crime-terror nexus 
points”. In effect, often linked in legislation and regulation, both fraudulent activities do not even 
intersect. As a matter of fact, while money laundering reintroduces illicit cash into the financial system, 
terrorism financing funnels it to terrorist networks to mount terrorist attacks. In June 2003, due in 
essence to the paucity of seemingly delineated roles and coordination procedures, but also because of 
the limited success it produced, OGQ was plainly disbanded.  
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3. “Guilty by Association” 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the government’s hunt for terrorist funds which targeted Islamic charities 
and relief organizations had disastrous effects, not only on charities fundraisers who have been charged 
with channelling donations to terrorists, but also on Muslim donors themselves who started to fear 
ending up in some government database of suspected supporters of terrorism. As the “war on terror” 
intensified, the government tightened its grip around individuals, groups, and entities, which it 
suspected of financially supporting terrorism. Federal prosecutors continued to target Islamic charities 
with the firm belief that at least some of them, while promoting humanitarian causes, work secretly to 
channel torrents of cash to Islamist rebel groups across the Middle-East.  
The first in a line of Islamic charities that came under the spotlight of the American government, 
especially its Treasury Department, was the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. It 
inaugurated a long trail of cases in which the federal prosecutors sought to suppress groups based on 
either or both counts: logistical support to terrorism and violation of embargos on Iran or Iraq. Some 
relief organizations have been shut down on mere allegations of re-routing funds to terrorist causes. 
Originally known as the Occupied Land Fund, the Holy Land Foundation was established first in 
California in 1989 as a tax-exempt charity (Note 11). In 1992, it relocated to Richmond, Texas, 
where—with an annual budget that reached $14 million—it became incontestably the largest 
U.S.-based Islamic charity. In 2001, it was charged with channelling money to charity organizations 
known as “Zakat committees” that operated in the Palestinian territories, under the control of Hamas, 
blacklisted since 1995 as a terrorist organization. 
Similar to the Christian tithe, Zakat is the third and most important of the five pillars of Islam (Note 12), 
and to fulfil this central obligation of their religion, Muslims donate 2.5 percent of their savings on an 
annual basis. According to Islamic law, this money is not supposed to go to anyone who is not a 
Muslim. As a matter of fact, there are two types of charities in Islam: Sadaqa which is voluntary and 
can be given anytime, and Zakat which is mandatory. Zakat ought to be given to the most deserving 
among the poor and destitute. Money can also be donated to mosques and charitable organizations, 
including relief foundations for widows, orphans, war displaced persons, victims of natural disasters, 
refugees, etc. 
On December 4, 2001, pursuant to its designation by the federal authorities as a terrorist organization, 
the Holy Land Foundation’s assets were frozen by the FBI and Treasury agents on the account that the 
charity provided logistic support to Hamas activists, through direct cash transfer to its Islamic charity 
committees (“Zakat Committees”) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Transferred funds were supposedly 
utilized by Hamas to support Koranic schools (“madrasah”) operated by the group, and to recruit 
suicide bombers offering financial aid to their families (Note 13). 
On July 27, 2004, a decisive step was taken to crack down on the suspected charity, when the Justice 
Department obtained an indictment against the Human Life Foundation. It accused the charity of 
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conspiracy to provide aid to a terrorist organization, alleging that the group wired $12.4 million to 
Hamas militants from 1995 to 2001, the year the government decided to freeze its assets. In addition, 
the group was indicted on the charge of having raised a total of $57 million, since its incorporation in 
1992, but only reported $36.2 million to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Note 14). Prosecutors 
acknowledged that the Holy Land Foundation did not carry out terrorist attacks, but acted as the “social 
wing” of Hamas, “much like a social welfare agency… to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinian 
population and solidify loyalty to Hamas” (Note 15). 
To corroborate their charges with proof against the charity, the federal prosecutors declared having 
received 21 binders of documents from the Israeli government, containing an estimated 8,000 pages of 
gathered intelligence the contents of which—in compliance with the secrecy provisions of Executive 
Order 13224 and the Patriot Act—have never been disclosed to provide evidence of conspiracy against 
U.S. security (Note 16). 
Plausibly the first of its kind in American judicial history, the pending case (based on copious reliance 
on foreign-sourced intelligence) posed abysmal questions as to the independence and integrity of the 
American legal system. To defence lawyers, allegations against the Human Life Foundation were 
simply unwarranted and influenced by political pressure from the Hebrew state (Note 17), a stance 
largely shared by Georgetown University law Professor, Jonathan Turley, who called the case “one of 
the most troubling since 9/11”, the evidence was simply unreliable as it could have been tainted by the 
long-standing tensions between the state of Israel and Hamas. He contended: “It is always dangerous to 
rely on intelligence from (a country) that is at ground zero in a dispute” (Note 18). 
Unsurprisingly, charges retained against the Holy Land Foundation and its leaders ranged from 
conspiracy, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, tax evasion, and money 
laundering. The indictment also named specific officers of the charity: President Shukri Abu Baker, 
Chairman Ghassen Elashi, Executive Director Haitham Maghawi, and four others. Five were arrested 
and two were considered fugitives. To Attorney General John Ashcroft, the message was clear, “The 
United States will ensure that both terrorists and their financiers meet the same, certain justice.” He 
warned: “To those who exploit good hearts to secretly fund violence and murder, this prosecution sends 
a clear message: There is no distinction between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who 
knowingly finance terrorist attacks” (Note 19). 
By October 2007, because of lack of convincing evidence, the indictment subsequently led to a first 
trial which immediately ended in a mistrial when the jurors failed to come to a unanimous decision on 
most of the accounts. During the trial, lawyers of the Holy Land Foundation indicated the weakness of 
provided evidence, especially the testimonies of two anonymous witnesses called by the government 
for that purpose: the first, an Israeli Security Agency legal advisor known to the jury and defence as 
“Avi”, and an Israeli Defence Forces officer, nicknamed “Major Lior”. After nineteen days of 
deliberations, the case ended in a mistrial after the jury declared its inability to reach a unanimous 
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verdict on any of the charges against defendants (Note 20). To defence attorneys, in addition to the 
“faulty translations” and “questionable foreign intelligence” (Note 21) on which prosecution heavily 
depended, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations, Red Cross, CARE, 
European Commission and many NGOs were other groups that donated to “zakat committees”, but 
none of these has ever been singled out as a purveyor of funds for any terrorist group (Note 22). 
Paradoxical as it might seem to certain legal experts who consider the case as a precedent in American 
legal history, reliance on classified information, inaccessible overall by defendants and their lawyers, 
runs counter the American higher values of justice and transparency. When allegations should be 
sustained by evidence, they stressed, but evidence could not be disclosed, on the basis that it may 
jeopardize efforts to crack down on terrorists, how can one prove that he or she is innocent? In the case 
of Muslim charities, they are guilty until proven innocent. 
In September 2008, the second Holy Land Foundation trial by a federal court in Dallas began to last six 
weeks after which the jury handed down a guilty verdict on sixty-nine counts. The charity, now defunct, 
was sentenced to one year’s probation, but this proved to be inconsequential as it remained designated 
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), therefore unable to renew its activities. It was 
convicted on ten counts of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization, eleven counts of conspiracy to provide funds, goods and services to a Specifically 
Designated Terrorist (SDT), and ten counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Its chieftains 
received sentences ranging from fifteen to sixty-five years in prison (Note 23). As the Department of 
Justice stated at the time:  
The government presented evidence at trial that, as the U.S. began to scrutinize individuals and entities 
in the United States who were raising funds for terrorist groups in the mid-1990s, the HLF intentionally 
hid its financial support for Hamas behind the guise of charitable donations. HLF and these five 
defendants provided approximately $12.4 million in support to Hamas and its goal of creating an 
Islamic Palestinian state by eliminating the State of Israel through violent jihad (Note 24). 
In the same vein, commenting on the verdicts, Patrick Rowan, Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security observed: 
Today’s verdicts are important milestones in America’s efforts against financiers of terrorism. For many 
years, the Holy Land Foundation used the guise of charity to raise and funnel millions of dollars to the 
infrastructure of the Hamas terror organization. This prosecution demonstrates our resolve to ensure 
that humanitarian relief efforts are not used as a mechanism to disguise and enable support for 
terrorist groups (Note 25). 
Immediately after the proclaimed verdicts, the Holy Land Foundation attorneys filed an appeal with the 
U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit which, in a decision it issued on December 7, 2011 (“United 
States v. El-Mezain et al.”) (Note 26), upheld the sentences against the charity leaders. The Fifth Circuit 
noted that “despite raising a myriad of issues, including numerous claims of erroneous evidentiary 
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rulings, the defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions”, 
(Note 27) including wiretap evidence showing that Holy Life Foundation supported Hamas by 
channelling money to “zakat committees” in the West Bank and Gaza—which the defendants knew 
were controlled by Hamas. 
Similarly, while recognizing that the district court which handed down the verdicts against the leaders 
of the charity—had erred in allowing two witnesses (“Avi” and “Major Lior”) to testify under a 
pseudonym despite their knowledge about Hamas financing and control of “zakat committees”—that 
error was “harmless” simply because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit contended, it was necessary to use pseudonyms to protect the safety of 
witnesses (Note 28). 
The same predicament befell other national Islamic charities that have been shut down on allegations of 
re-routing funds to terrorist causes. Quite similar instances involved groups like the two Chicago-based 
Islamic charities, the Global Relief Foundation and the Benevolence International Foundation, the 
Islamic American Relief Agency, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, and the KinderUSA 
(Toledo-Ohio-based), etc. that proved powerless countering the government action against them. 
Expectedly, the crackdown on Muslim charities by the American government has not only complicated 
legitimate humanitarian relief efforts, creating a huge gap in the charity delivery service, but Muslim 
donors themselves started to suspect their donations being diverted from their appropriate recipients to 
the hands of terrorists. They mostly found themselves caught in the trap of how to fulfil one of the 
central tenets of their faith, which is Zakat, without inadvertently being linked to terrorism. For 
example, donating to the wrong charity, even unbeknownst to them, might put them on the wrong side 
of the war on terror. 
Very often American Muslim leaders called on the federal government for guidelines on how to 
accomplish their religious duty of alms without being accused of terrorism, but very often their appeals 
fell upon deaf ears. In other words, they wanted the government to issue a “white list” of “approved” 
charities that are safe for people to contribute to, without fear of being interrogated by the FBI. But, for 
the federal authorities, a list of government-approved charities would open the door to more fraudulent 
practices, as safe or “clean” charities could be easily infiltrated by terrorists. To thwart the financial 
networks likely to channel funds to terrorist groups, the government has, by contrast, created lists of 
individuals and organizations it accused of funding terrorism (Note 29). At the same time, it issued 
general guidelines aiming to help charities maintain some degree of transparency, and encouraging 
them to practice “due diligence” to ensure that their assets are used for the right cause. 
In sum, while it has complicated legitimate humanitarian efforts, the crackdown on Muslim charities, 
epitomized here by the Holy Land Foundation case, pressured some Muslim relief groups to seek 
alternative ways whereby they could channel aid to those in need without raising suspicion of ties to 
terrorist networks. Instead of sending cash, some started to forward actual relief supplies such as rice, 
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sugar and cooking oil, etc. Said Nihad Awad, active member of the Washington-based Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), one of the country’s largest Muslim organizations: “If you send 
lentils, at least no one can accuse you of supporting terrorism” (Note 30). 
 
4. National Security vs. Individual Liberties 
Loss of civil liberties following the attacks of September 11, 2001, not only profoundly affected 
American Muslims who became the first target of a new policy which, amongst others, led to a 
tightening of the grip around them, but also alarmed a number of legal experts and civil rights activists 
who started to worry about the erosion of that community’s constitutional rights. As the Bush 
administration put the nation on high alert in an effort to protect Americans from further terrorism, the 
crisis spawned unprecedented expansion of government powers. 
Tellingly, the case of the Holy Life Foundation and other U.S.-based Muslim charities prompts more 
than a question about the status of American Muslims today, essentially the curtailing of their 
constitutionally protected civil liberties in the name of national security. Most civil rights advocates 
acknowledge that striking a balance between freedom and security has always been difficult for the 
very reason that liberty and security are not mutually exclusive. The advocates agree that waging a war 
on terrorism financing without clear parameters or goals against unspecified “evildoers”, and targeting 
Muslim charities without due process, could produce but little tangible results. 
The emergence of a new type of terrorism, triggered by the 9/11 attacks, produced a new type of 
reaction on the part of the government which, as the sovereign guarantor of national security, took 
exceptional measures to pre-empt further aggression. As a result, not only the legitimation of practices 
of exceptionalism gave the federal prosecutors almost unchecked powers to act outside clearly defined 
confines of the law, but has further problematized the relationship between liberty and security, and 
called into question the limits that operate upon political practices and sovereign decisions. As plainly 
stated by Andrew W. Neal (BBC journalist and author), in his famous book, Exceptionalism and the 
Politics of Counter-Terrorism, “The attempt to legally codify a domain of exceptional prerogatives and 
practices regarding ‘terrorism’ and ‘security threats’ is fraught with difficulties. It becomes apparent 
that the designation of exceptions is itself extra-legal; it does not directly draw upon the law as its 
source of legitimacy, but upon more emotive claims about threat, civilization, security and so on” (Note 
31). 
To Stephen J. Schulhofer (Professor of Law at New York University School of Law and one of 
America’s most distinguished scholar of criminal justice), in his well-known book, The Enemy Within 
(Note 32), rather than reflecting America’s mythical founding ideals that regard the U.S. Constitution 
as the “sacrosanct work of genius representing the pinnacle of human justice and liberty,” the 
anti-terrorist measures (epitomized by Executive Order 13224 and the USA Patriot Act) are direct 
consequences of what he calls “bad compromises” (Note 33) where civil liberties have been 
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circumvented in return for no significant anti-terrorism gains. Denouncing what he calls “September 11 
opportunism,” (Note 34) Schulhofer considers that the government’s determination to make terrorism 
prosecutions into “exceptional” cases is counterproductive as this may undermine the due process 
needed for criminal convictions. A constitutional government, he contends, is an institutionalized 
system of checks and balances that serves to limit political power, so when the executive power goes 
unchecked, in the name of whatever state of emergency, arbitrary and prejudicial violent practices will 
prevail, giving way to the violation of the constitutionally protected civil liberties (Note 35). 
Thereupon, what seems at stake for the supporters of individual fundamental rights is not so much the 
fact that U.S. government closed down a considerable number of national and local Islamic relief 
groups, but the reason that it has never been effective to document any bona fide trail showing how the 
money from the charities got into the actual hands of terrorists. Added to that, several Muslim 
charitable groups have been supressed by the Executive without any checks and balances from 
Congress or the Judiciary. Some of them were not even on any government watch list. 
From a strict legal standpoint and without a precise, stable and commonly agreed definition of 
terrorism, experts argue that the measures adopted to fight and defeat terrorism will be difficult to 
justify because they lack clear legal basis. This is of paramount importance if terrorist actions are to be 
demarcated from other criminal acts. Experts equally assert that the need for an authoritative definition 
of the concepts “liberty” and “security” would not only reduce intellectual contestation over what is 
“legal” and what is “arbitrary,” but would also help overcome the mounting difficulty of drawing sharp 
lines of distinction between “truth” and “judgement”. In this respect, Andrew W. Neal argues: “From 
the perspective of the law, proper definitions are necessary if rights and freedoms are to be 
‘fundamental’ and not simply precariously subject to political whims” (Note 36). He adds: “This 
discursive contestation at the institutional level serves to further undermine the possibility of stable 
distinctions between ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, ‘norm’ and ‘exception’” (Note 37). 
In the same vein, the use of secret evidence and other extrajudicial mechanisms under the pretext of 
national security pursuant the Patriot Act, according to supporters of civil liberties, is nothing more 
than an attempt by an “overzealous” government to hide behind the veil of its own laws which have 
questionable constitutional legitimacy. Worse, withholding evidence from suspected charities on the 
basis that disclosing official findings might benefit terrorists and their supporters, is another means to 
sidestep justice in an effort to supposedly prevent another 9/11 attack.  
In her famous book, Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Anti-Terrorism Measures 
threaten Our Civil Liberties (Note 38), Nancy Chang, a well-known senior lawyer at the Centre for 
Constitutional Rights in New York, offers historical account of civil liberties abuses by U.S. 
governments, epitomized by the internment of Japanese-Americans, following the Pearl Harbor attack 
in 1941 (Note 39). Chang highlights the “inappropriateness”, “unconstitutionality” and “immorality” of 
the U.S.A Patriot Act (Note 40). To her, the legislation in question not only provides an ambiguous and 
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potentially arbitrary definition of terrorism, but also institutes guilt by association under the aegis of 
making an explicit distinction between full U.S. citizens and U.S. residents and foreigners when 
applying the law (Note 41). 
The claim that the government is applying the law unevenly has not only been the concern of legal 
experts who warned against the erosion of the nation’s widely cherished values, especially equal 
treatment under the law, but alarmed civil liberties advocates who firmly denounced what they dubbed 
the government’s double talk and double standard policy. They especially cited the government’s 
“velvet glove” treatment of Halliburton Corporation, a giant defence contractor once headed by Bush’s 
vice president, Dick Cheney. Since 2001 Halliburton has been accused by the Treasury and Justice 
Departments for undertaking business with Iran; and it was at the time listed as terrorism sponsor. 
Instead of seizing and freezing its assets, in compliance with Executive Order 13224 and the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the Justice Department guilelessly sent an inquiry to Halliburton requesting 
“information with regard to compliance,” something which was immediately provided by the 
company’s board of directors, unequivocally stating that dealings with Iran had been done through its 
Cayman Islands subsidiary, not its U.S.-based entity (Note 42). 
Furthermore, the degree of secrecy surrounding prosecution of targeted charities and the reliance on 
classified information, inaccessible by defence lawyers, according to OMB Watch (Note 43), a major 
government watchdog group, makes it more difficult for them to present their cases in court (Bush’s 
Executive Order 13224 could even block them while they are under investigation). As a result, 
organizations and individuals suspected of supporting terrorism see little interest challenging 
government decisions. They know that however scant the evidence, or even nonexistent at all, in the 
eyes of government officials they are guilty until proven innocent. To OMB Watch activists, the intent 
is clear, “Organizations and individuals suspected of supporting terrorism are guilty until proven 
innocent” (Note 44). 
All in all, the debate over civil liberties vs. national security is only the tip of a very large iceberg, as 
the question goes far beyond Islamic charities. It touches upon a wide array of issues ranging from 
wire-tapping, e-mails monitoring, surveillance cameras, cell phone access, through freedom of speech 
and self-defence, and poses formidable challenges across the Western world and other nations fighting 
against terrorism. What’s more, the advent of the high tech revolution over the last few decades 
coupled with the rise of well-structured terrorist networks making use of highly sophisticated tools of 
communication, further complicated the task of how well threatened states could maintain security 
within their respective borders, without compromising fundamental individual freedoms. As clearly 
pointed out by President Obama: “You can’t have a 100 percent security, and also then have 100 
percent privacy and inconvenience” (Note 45). 
As a matter of fact, the polemic triggered by NSA contractor Edward Snowden who, in June 2013, 
leaked top secret documents to the media, in the name of democratic transparency, is a case in point 
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(Note 46). Furthermore, the decision by Apple Inc., after the San Bernardino (California) terrorist 
attack in December 2015, not to unlock one of the perpetrator’s cell phones, is another instance 
typifying the liberty security dilemma. The corporation even declined a request by the FBI to create a 
new version of the phone’s iOS operating system that disables certain security features, contending that 
such an act might jeopardize privacy rights of its customers (Note 47).  
On another hand, failure of some democratic states, such as France, Belgium, and recently Turkey, to 
protect their citizens against incessant terrorist attacks, especially granting extended prerogatives to law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, reignited, as never before, the debate over the role of the 
government in assuring public security. It remains, however, that the most important question should 
not be how to secure public safety without infringing upon individual liberties, but rather how to 
contain the terrorist threat without denying basic freedoms to entire groups. To this regard, government 
officials ought probably to take lessons from what happened in Germany, in the 1930s and 1940s, when 
Adolph Hitler, subsequent to the Reichstag fire (which he attributed to the Communist conspirator), 
suspended all civil liberties including freedom of the press and political dissent.  
 
5. Conclusion 
By and large, while it remains challenging to painstakingly capture the ambivalence surrounding the 
security/liberty discourse, further problematized by the interplay of a multitude of factors (legal, 
political, religious, etc.), room for a constructive debate seems quite plausible. Added to that, to 
detractors on both extremes of the contest, it became clear that framing the problem of post-9/11 
practices of exceptionalism, in the sole issue of liberty and security, means nothing more than acting 
within the stifling confines of a highly problematic dualism, incapable of properly addressing the crux 
of the problem.  
Therefore, departing from the very fact that the relationship between liberty and security has been 
posed as one of balance, should we consider them as inversely proportional, that is securing the one 
means sacrificing the other? To civil liberties advocates who refute this either/or dualism, liberty and 
security are not stable referents, but “highly mobile, contested and co-optable political discourses” 
(Note 48). Similarly, they argue that the issue of exceptionalism should not be addressed through 
dualistic approaches with clear boundaries between liberty and security. Rather, the relation between 
the two poles should be a mutually constitutive dialectic where the protection of the one (liberty), on 
the contrary reinforces and improves the other (security). 
In toto, despite President Obama’s promise in his 2009 speech in Cairo (Note 49) to make life easier for 
American Muslims and secure their right to accomplish their religious obligation of Zakat, Muslim 
leaders claim that targeting their charities without due process, in the name of national security, is 
nothing more than a political manoeuvre to make American people believe that the government is 
thwarting terrorist financing. To them, the assault on their charities is not about safety, and surely not 
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about security, it is about politics. 
To be on the safe side, American Muslim charities should be on guard on several fronts. Even if they 
contend that very often they receive cash from anonymous donors, leaders of Islamic relief groups 
should be vigilant as not accept funds from anyone identified as a suspected terrorist. They should 
equally demonstrate transparency and ensure that none of their employees or board members is 
affiliated in any way with terrorist networks. 
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